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RECORD PIRACY AND MODERN PROBLEMS
OF INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED
STATES AND BRITISH COPYRIGHT LAW*
Frank L. Fine**
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most deeply rooted problems in United States
and British copyright law is the question of how to treat the
"innocent infringer" 1 who infringes unknowingly or without
reason to suspect that he is infringing. Congress and Parliament have regarded the prospect of special treatment for such
infringers with ambivalence. The United States and British
copyright laws reflect this confusion. Each country had at one
time or another provided the innocent infringer with total immunity from liability, limited remedial relief, or no protection
whatsoever.
The problem of innocent infringement has been revived
by the record' piracy crisis that now grips the American and
1981 by Frank L. Fine
* This article appeared
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substantially
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form

in

Lov.

L.A.

L.J. (1981) (inaugural issue). It has also been entered in the 1981
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
** B.A., 1974 Loyola University, Los Angeles; J.D., 1982, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles.
1. For an overview of the subject, see Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent
Infringers of Copyrights, Study No. 25, in STUDmS PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1960). Also cf. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (1978) (Innocence
is not a defense, but does affect the remedies available) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER]
and Yankewich, Intent and Related Problems in Plagiarism,33 S. CAL. L. REv. 233
(1960) (intent required for plagiarism).
2. I will use the term "record" to connote conventional records and tapes.
Under the United States Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), the term of art for "record" is "phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) defines "phonorecords" as "material
objects in which sounds.., are fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." The equivalent word of
art under the British Copyright Act of 1956 (1956 British Act) is the term "record,"
which is defined as "any disc, tape ... or other device in which sounds are embodied
so as to be capable (with or without the aid of some other instrument) of being autoENTERTAINMENT
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British music industries. Due to the severe impact that record
piracy has had on music industry profits, copyright owners' in
musical works" and sound recordings' may no longer file lawsuits primarily against pirates.' There is evidence that copyright owners will litigate against sellers of pirated or counterfeit records with greater frequency.
For example, in the United States, the Recording Indusmatically reproduced therefrom ....
"Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 48,
at 920 (1956).
3. The 1976 Act defines "copyright owner" indirectly. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)
states that "'copyright owner,' with respect to any of the exclusive rights comprised
in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976)
adds that "[clopyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author
or authors of the work." Likewise, under the 1956 British Act, "the author of a work
shall be entitled to any copyright subsisting in the work ....
"Copyright Act, 1956,
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 4(1), at 859 (1956).
4. The 1976 Act does not specifically define "work" or "musical work." However, the term "work" is defined indirectly. "A work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . .permit[s] it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated .... " 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976) adds that "[wiorks of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary work; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings." (emphasis added). The 1956 British Act does not define "work" or "musical work." However, the Musical Copyright
Act of 1902, which was repealed upon passage of the 1956 Act, defined a "musical
work" as "any combination of melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, reduced to writing or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced." Musical Copyright Act, 1902, 2 Edw. 7, c. 15, § 3, at 18 (1902). See also R.F. WHALE, COPYRIGHT 38
(1971); W.A. COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 172 (1965) [hereinafter cited

as

COPINGER].

5. Congress created a copyright for owners of sound recordings in 1971. Act of
October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, §1 (f), 85 Stat. 391 (amended 1976). The 1976
Act defines "sound recordings" as "works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or others sounds.., regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1976). The 1956 British Act defines a "sound recording" as "the aggregate of the
sounds embodied in, and capable of being reproduced by means of, a record of any
description ...... Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74 § 12(9), at 875 (1956).
6. A sampling of the record piracy litigation directed against pirates includes: A
& M Records, Inc. v. M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1978); Pickwick
Music Corp. v. Record Prods., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Beechwood Music Corp. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Chappell & Co. v.
Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Reeve Music Co. v. Crest Records,
Inc., 190 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). In contrast, only a handful of reported cases
involve vendor liability for the sale of infringing records. See Miller v. Goody, 139 F.
Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260
(2d Cir. 1957) (large record dealer); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (department store chain); Harm's Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
163 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (department store chain).
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try Association of America (RIAA) has used the mass media
to drum up sentiment against the National Association of Recording Merchandisers (NARM). A popular American magazine recently published RIAA's warnings that it will vigorously pursue maximum civil liability against retailers who sell
counterfeit records.7 The RIAA defends its litigious rhetoric
by citing a study that it conducted, in which investigators allegedly found counterfeit merchandise in over ninety percent
of the 500 retail outlets checked. 8 The RIAA claims that such
a proliferation of counterfeit product in the retail community
could not occur without the retailers' knowledge that they are
dealing in infringing records.9
In its zeal to seek relief against the infringing retailer, the
RIAA has overlooked the more likely explanation for its incredible ninety percent finding. As the president of one large
record chain has observed, counterfeit records would not be
circulating in most retail outlets unless the records have
evaded the scrutiny of the retailers involved. 10 Contrary to the
RIAA's position, if there is widespread retailer involvement in
counterfeit sales, many such retailers may be unaware of the
infringement.
The current dispute between the RIAA and the NARM is
a modern reenactment of the historical conflict between copyright owners and innocent infringers. Copyright owners have
traditionally claimed that injunctive and monetary relief
should be available against all those who commercially exploit
an infringing work, including those who deal in unauthorized
copies" of an infringing work. Conversely, persons who deal as
7. At the annual meeting of the National Association of Recording Merchandisers (NARM) in March 1980, the president of the Recording Industry Association of
Americal Stanley Gortikov, allegedly warned the retailers that "if you buy or sell
counterfeits, we shall do everything possible not only to encourage maximum criminal
penalties but also maximum civil damages. We want you to hurt, badly." ROLLING
STONE, May 15, 1980, at 28 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ROLLING STONE, Apr. 17, 1980, at 27 (summarizing viewpoint of Russ Solomon, President of Tower Records).
11. The 1976 Act defines "copies" as "material object[s], other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (emphasis added). The 1956 British Act does not define "copy" per se, but only in reference
to what constitutes an infringing copy. An "infringing copy," with respect to literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic work "means a reproduction otherwise than in the form
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a matter of course in copies of copyrightable works claim that
they should be provided a defense of innocence.
This article applies a comparative analysis to the historical and current treatment of innocent infringers under the
United States and British copyright laws. In light of the growing danger of litigation against record retailers, emphasis will
be given to the treatment of retailers who innocently sell
counterfeit records. It is argued that the United States Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) does not adequately reconcile the
just concerns of copyright owners and innocent infringers.
The 1976 Act makes available to copyright owners, irrespective of the infringer's innocence, injunctive relief to prevent
further exploitation of infringing works in addition to recovery of the defendant's profits, or the amount that he has been
unjustly enriched. The 1976 Act also allows the recovery of
actual damages against the innocent infringer. By making actual damages available against those who innocently infringe,
the 1976 Act in effect, shifts the copyright owner's risk of loss
to the infringer. Whenever the innocent infringer is compelled
to pay the copyright owner's actual damages, the infringer insures the owner against losses attributable to exploitation of
unauthorized copies.
This article also argues that the 1976 Act's "strict liability" approach toward innocent infringers is unjustifiable.
There is n6 persuasive public policy that vindicates a shift of
the copyright owner's burden of loss to the innocent infringer,
and in particular, to the record retailer. Moreover, the availability of actual damages, no matter how slight, may unnecessarily burden the infringer's First Amendment interest in disseminating artistic, literary, and musical works to the public.
In contrast to the 1976 Act, the British Copyright Act of
1956 (1956 British Act) strikes a sensitive balance between the
copyright owner's desire to prevent the commercial exploitation of unauthorized copies and the need to protect innocent
infringers. The 1956 British Act provides that if the infringer
can prove his innocence, the copyright owner's remedies are
limited to injunctive relief and recovery of the infringer's
of a cinematograph film [and] in relation to a sound recording means a record embod-

ying that recording. . . . " Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 18(3)(a)-(b), at
883 (1956). Whenever the term "copy" is used in the text of this article, it shall connote the reproduction of any work, including a sound recording, in the form of
records or other material objects.
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profits. Actual damages are not allowed.
II.

RECORD PIRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

In the last ten years, record piracy has evolved into an
enormously lucrative business. In 1971, a House Report stated
that the annual volume of business conducted by record pirates in the United States at that time exceeded $100 million. 12 Recent estimates indicate that record piracy is costing
the American record industry more than $400 million annu14
ally,"8 compared with annual legal sales of $3.5 billion. It
may be arguable that the current record industry slump is
largely attributable to counterfeit sales.
A.

Relief for Copyright Owners

Under the 1976 Act copyright owners in musical works
and sound recordings who are victimized by record piracy,
generally music publishers and record companies respectively,1 5 can obtain relief in several ways.
First, the copyright owner may file an infringement action
against the record pirate himself.1 6 The Act provides that the
12. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
13. TIME, Mar. 10, 1980, at 70.
14. NEw YORKER, Apr. 16, 1979, at 31, 32.
15. Although the "author" of a musical work is originally its composer, ownership of the work is usually assigned to a music publisher. The 1976 Act provides that
"[tlhe ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means
of conveyance .... " 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1976). See Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5
Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 36(1), at 905 (1956) for the British equivalent to § 201(d)(1). The 1976
Act also provides that a sound recording may be protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C. §
114(a) (1976). The initial owner of the copyright in a sound recording is its "author,"
Id. § 201(a) (1976), or in other words, the maker of the recording. Record companies
are frequently the copyright owner of sound recordings released to the public in the
form of records because the sound recordings are usually financed by and recorded
under the supervision of record manufacturers. Under the 1956 British Act,
"[c]opyright shall subsist . .. in every sound recording of which the maker was a
qualified person ....
" Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 12(1), at 875
(1956).
16. As of January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, common law copyright was preempted. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976) provides that "all legal or equitable
rights that are the equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright," including rights in musical works and sound recordings, are governed
exclusively by the 1976 Act. After January 1, 1978, "no person is entitled to any such
right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
State." Id. The words "equivalent right" should not be interpreted in the sense of
substantively equal protection under common law and Federal statute. The House
Report indicates that "[als long as a work fits within one of the general subject mat-
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duplication of a sound recording in the form of records for
public distribution without the permission of the copyright
17
owner is actionable as an infringement of the copyright.
Likewise, if the pirate fails to pay the required compulsory
license fees to the copyright owner of the musical work embodied in the duplicated sound recording, such an act of omission constitutes an infringement of the rights of the copyright
owner.18 Neither copyright owner must prove an intent to infringe in order to establish an infringement. 19
ter categories.

the bill prevents the States from protecting it. . ..." H.R. REP. No.

1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976), "even if the precise contours of the right differ
.... " 1 NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 2.01[B]. It is therefore highly questionable that
common law copyright in the form of conversion will survive in the United States.
However, the 1976 Act provides that "[w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed before
February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any
State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2047." 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(c) (1976). On preemption, see Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 200, 206-14
(1978).
The 1956 British Act also abolishes common law copyright. With the exception of
university, crown copyright, and rules of equity, "no copyright, or right in the nature
of copyright, shall subsist otherwise than by virtue of this Act.. ." Copyright Act,
1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74 § 46(5), at 916 (1956). See also Aldous, The Philosophy
Behind the English Copyright Law, 10 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 302, 305 (1963); CopINGER, supra note 4, at §§ 21-44.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1976) provides that "[t]he exclusive rights of the owner
of copyright in a sound recording [include] the right to duplicate the sound recording
in the form of phonorecords .... " See generally Meyers, Sound Recordings and the
New Copyright Act, 22 N.Y. LAw SCHOOL L. REV. 573 (1977), reprinted in N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV., THE CoMPLETE GuInE To THE NEw COPYRIGHT LAW 281 (1977). 17

U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976) provides that "[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner. . . is an infringer of the copyright." The 1956 British
Act provides that "[t]he acts restricted by the copyright in a sound recording [include] making a record embodying the recording .... "Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5
Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 12(5)(a), at 874 (1956).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1976) provides that "[w]hen phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the public in the United States under
the authority of the copyright owner, any other person may, by complying with the
provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (1976) provides that "[a]ny person who
wishes to obtain a compulsory license ... shall... serve notice of intention to do so
on the copyright owner." 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(2) (1976) provides that "[flailure to serve
or file the notice required forecloses the possibility of a compulsory license and, in the
absence of a negotiated license, renders the making and distribution of phonorecords
actionable as acts of infringement under section 501. . ." For the British analogue
to § 115, see Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 8(1), at 866 (1956).
19. The often cited American rule is that "[iintention to infringe is not essential
under the Act." Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931).
The 1956 British Act provides that "[t]he acts restricted by the copyright in a
...musical work [include] reproducing the work in any material form .... " Copy-
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In addition, the 1976 Act provides that copyright owners
in musical works and sound recordings may sue vendors in an
infringement action for the sale of counterfeit records."0 As in
right Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 2(5)(a), at 857 (1956). See also Copyright Act of
1976, supra note 17. Under the 1976 British Act, the state of mind of the pirate is
relevant only to the remedies available to the copyright owner and not to the question of infringement.
Where in an action for infringement of copyright it is proved or admitted-(a) that an infringement was committed, but (b) that at the time
of the infringement the defendant was not aware, and had no reasonable
grounds for suspecting, that copyright subsisted in the work or other
subject-matter to which the action relates, the plaintiff shall not be entitled under this section to any damages against the defendant in respect
of the infringement, but shall be entitled to an account of profits ....
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 17(2)(a)-(b), at 882 (1956).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1976) provides that the copyright owner of a musical
work has the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or lending ....
The House Report adds that "any unauthorized public distribution of copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be an infringement." H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976). The copyright owner of a sound recording
may assert the same right of distribution against a vendor of unauthorized phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976). For a general discussion of vendor liability
for the sale of unauthorized phonorecords, see Note, Copyright: Liability of Seller of
Unlicensed Phonograph Records, 46 CALiF. L. Rav. 621 (1958).
Under the 1956 British Act, copyright owners of musical works and sound recordings have rights parallel to those provided by the 1976 Act.
The copyright in... musical.., work is infringed by any person who,
in the United Kingdom, or in any other country to which this section
extends, and without the license of the owner of the copyright,(a) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or
hire any article . . . if to his knowledge the making of the article constituted an infringement of that copyright, or (in the case of an imported
article) would have constituted an infringement of that copyright if the
article had been made in the place into which it was imported.
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 5(3)(a), at 860 (1956).
The 1956 British Act makes available to copyright owners of sound recordings the
same right against vendors that owners in musical works enjoy under the Act. However, unlike the American statute the British law provides that owners of sound recordings have a cause of action against vendors of unauthorized copies not in the
form of records. The 1956 British Act provides that the copyright in a sound recording is "infringed by any person who . . . (a) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade
offers or exposes for sale or hire any article. . . if to his knowledge the making of the
article constituted an infringement . . . " (emphasis added). Copyright Act, 1956, 4
& 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 16(3)(a), at 881 (1956).
The impact of the 1976 Act and the 1956 British Act on vendors of unauthorized
records may be modified by international agreement. The United States and Great
Britain are parties to the Universal Copyright Convention, which provides that published and unpublished works of nationals of each contracting State shall enjoy in
every other contracting State the same protection as that other State accords to
works of its nationals. Universal Copyright Convention, Geneva Text, Sept. 6, 1952, 6
U.S.T. 2731, at 2733, T.I.A.S. No. 3324. See also Paris Text, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T.
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the case of the record pirate, the vendor's intent to infringe is
irrelevant in establishing the infringement.2 1
B.

The Problem of Direct and Indirect Infringement

It should be readily apparent that the record pirate and
the infringing record retailer are two different types of infringer. The pirate is a "direct" infringer; one who creates an
infringing product for commercial purposes. Like the copyist
who appropriates another's literary or artistic work as his
own, the record pirate is a deliberate or willing infringer. 22 In
1341, at 1345, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. The Geneva and Paris texts went into force in the
United States on September 16, 1955 and July 10, 1974, respectively. These texts
went into force in the United Kingdom on September 27, 1957 and July 10, 1974,
respectively. See generally A. BOOSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERsAL
CONVENTION (3d ed. 1972). The United States and Great Britain are also parties to
the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms, which obligates each
contracting State to protect producers against the making of duplicates without consent and the importation of unauthorized records. Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms,
Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, at 325, T.I.A.S. No. 7808. However, the Convention left
open the means of implementing its mandate to each contracting State.
21. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 229 (1952)
(innocence of seller held irrelevant in an action for infringement based on sale of
infringing statuettes. "Unbeknown to Woolworth, these dogs have been copied from
respondent's and by marketing them it became an infringer.' (emphasis in original).
See also Harm's Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 163 F. Supp. 484, at 485 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
(department store chain held liable for sale of infringing records) (citing above quotation with approval); McCulloch v. Zapun Ceramics, Inc., 97 U.S.P.Q. 12 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (infringing figurines).
In contrast, under the 1956 British Act, the copyright owner in a musical or
sound recording does not establish an infringement against the vendor unless "to his
knowledge the making of the article constituted an infringement of that copyright
Copyright
..... Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §§ 5(3)(a), at 860, and 16(3)(a), at
881 (1956). Knowledge in this context means actual, not constructive knowledge.
Knowledge could nonetheless be imputed when the average vendor would have
knowledge, unless the vendor can refute this inference with contrary evidence. R.C.A.
Corp. v. Custom Cleared Sales Pty. [19781 F.L.R. 576 (Super. Ct. N.S.W.) (interpreting the Australian copyright statute, which is an adopted form of the 1956 British
Act).
22. Record pirates or 'diskleggers' as they have been called, are manufacturers who re-record or 'dub' recordings made by legitimate companies
and sell them competitively. In this manner, they avoid having to pay
the performers for their time, and they have the benefit of the initial
recording company's talents in getting the finest rendition possible. Ordinarily, they also omit payment of the copyright, although, as far as the
copyright law is concerned, even a pirate has the right to record copyrighted musical compositions provided he files notice of intent and pays
the royalties.
139 F. Supp. 176, 180 n.4 (emphasis added). For a general background on record

RECORD PIRACY

1981]

the words of Justice Blackburn, "in almost all cases, a man
who copies a work without the authority of the owner, must
know that he is pirating the work of somebody."'
In contrast to the record pirate, the vendor of infringing
records is an "indirect" or "secondary" infringer, or one who
infringes in the course of dealing in products that are within
the scope of copyright.24 Due to the possibility of innocent infringement inherent in a secondary involvement with illegal
records or copies, the United States copyright law has historically singled out such infringers for special treatment.
III.

A.

HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INDIRECT
INFRINGERS UNDER FEDERAL LAW

Absolute Immunity

The passage of the copyright clause of the United States
Constitution in 1787 was intended by the Framers to abolish
the existing practice of applying to each state for a copyright. 5 The copyright clause was the first step in creating a
copyright that would be effective in all of the states. The
clause empowered Congress "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries.''

Central to the implementation of the copyright clause
was a "restraint upon trade,'v a concept that opposed the
piracy, see Note, Piracy on Records, 5 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1953). The modus operandi
of the counterfeiter is illustrated in the following account by a record company
executive:
Atlantic Recording Corporation paid approximately $80,000 to record an
album by Crosby, Stills and Nash, and then another $20,000 to advertise
and promote the album. Atlantic's costs for manufactured discs and prerecorded tapes of the album exceeded $600,000. It is just at this
point-after the record company has invested enormous sums of money
on a high-quality album, produced a hit and achieved wide market popularity-that the pirate swoops in to reap the benefits at little or no
expense.
S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 94 (4th ed. 1979).
23. Ex parte Beal, L.R., 3 Q.B. 387 at 392 (1868).
24. See J. CAVENDISH, A HANDBOOK OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITISH PUBLISHING PiRCTICE 44 (1974); COPINGER, supra note 4, § 471; R.F. WHALE, supra note 4, at 85.
25. E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 88 (1879).
26. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,para. 8.
27. J. TAUBMAN, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST 7 (1960) (citing Bergstrom, The
Businessman Deals with Copyright, THIRD COPYRIGHT L. Symp. 249, 251 (1940).
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free market system produced by the Revolution against England. Over 100 years after the clause was adopted, the United
States Supreme Court confirmed its purpose in the same direct language. In American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,"'
the Court asserted that "the purpose of the copyright law is
...to secure a monopoly ... of the right to publish the production which is the result of the inventor's thought."'2
An important question for Congress, as it drafted the first
federal copyright law, was how many exclusive rights should
be conferred on authors and inventors. Would copyright owners be limited to causes of action against plagiarists and copyists, or would owners be permitted to sue users in the commercial world as well? It was clear that some sanctions should
be provided against users to deter commercial exploitation of
infringing products. But what if a plagiarist submitted his
manuscript to a publisher who was unable to determine
whether a third party's protected work had been pirated? Or
what if a shopkeeper were sold a box of maps that were copied
from another's protected map, and the shopkeeper had no
reason to suspect that the maps were pirated copies? Should
such innocent publishers and shopkeepers be treated in the
same way as the plagiarist and the copyist?
The United States Copyright Act of 179080 (1790 Act) was
the first federal copyright statute to create a distinction between direct and indirect infringement. Section 2 of the 1790
Act provided that once a map, chart or book was published, if
any person other than the author "shall print, reprint, publish, or import ... any copy or copies ... without the consent of the author or proprietor . . . or knowing the same to
be so printed, reprinted, or imported, shall publish, sell, or
expose to sale [the same] without such consent .
,,, 1 such
person shall be liable for damages.
There were several problems inherent in Section 2 of the
1790 Act. First, the implementation of safeguards for innocent
indirect infringers was not consistent. Publishers and vendors
were protected, but printers and importers were not. Moreover, if a publisher or vendor did not knowingly infringe, he
suffered no liability whatsoever. The copyright owner could
28.
29.
30.
31.

207 U.S. 284, 293 (1907).
Id. at 293.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 124 (1975).
Id. § 2, at 124-25 (emphasis added).
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not obtain an injunction against or recover profits from the
innocently infringing publisher or seller.
The United States Copyright Act of 187082 (1870 Act)
perpetuated the deficiencies of Section 2 of the 1790 Act by
discriminating between classes of indirect infringers and by
insulating the protected class from all liability. Under the
1870 Act, the innocently infringing vendor retained total immunity from liability, but the infringing publisher became liable notwithstanding his innocence.a
B.

The 1909 Act: A Short-lived Remedial Approach

Under the United States Copyright Act of 1909 (1909
Act), printers, publishers, vendors, and importers (by amendment in 1947) could be liable for an infringement, irrespective
of their innocence.84 The former approach of absolute immunity, which characterized the 1790 and 1870 Acts, was replaced by a new remedial scheme.
Section 25(b) of the 1909 Act provided that infringers
would be liable for an injunction and required to pay
such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement as well as all the profits
which the infringer shall have made.., or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court
shall appearjust ... [not to] exceed the sum of $5,000
nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be res
garded as a penalty."
On its face, the statutory damages clause of Section 25(b)
appeared to provide a mechanism that would prevent recovery
of actual damages against the innocent infringer. The trial
court appeared to have discretion to weigh various factors, including the infringer's innocence, in making an award. The
very language of judicial discretion was, however, construed to
eliminate its application to innocent infringers.
32.
33.
34.

Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
Id. at §§ 99-100.
The United States Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) simply provided that

the copyright owner shall have the eilusive right "[t]o print, reprint, publish, copy
and vend the copyrighted work. .. ." 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1909).
35.

Id. at § 25(b) (1909) (emphasis added).
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1. Douglas v. Cunningham: Section 25(b) was Intended
to Protect the Copyright Owner
In the controversial 1935 case of Douglas v. Cunningham,86 the United States Supreme Court overturned the decision of the First Circuit to reduce the copyright owner's statutory award from $5,000 to $250 in a case where a newspaper
publisher had innocently infringed. In reaching its decision,
the Court broadly construed the plain language of the statutory damages provision "to give the owner of a copyright some
recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of
or impossible proof of damages or discovlaw render difficult
7
ery of profits.

'8

Douglas stood for a second proposition: The trial court
had discretion to award damages and profits, unless they were
both difficult or impossible to ascertain. In the latter event,
statutory damages were mandatory. 8s
When statutory damages were not appropriate, there remained the question of whether the trial courts could award
actual damages and profits cumulatively. This aspect of Douglas resulted in a split among jurisdictions. A number of courts
followed the Congressional mandate that either damages or
profits should be awarded, whichever is greater." But other
courts held that the express language of Section 25(b) authorized cumulative recovery.40 The result achieved in the latter
jurisdictions shifted the copyright owner's loss to the innocent
infringer.
The latitude given by the Douglas Court to trial judges
when statutory damages were appropriate was potentially far
36. 294 U.S. 207 (1935).
37. Id. at 209.
38. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1979);
Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1178 (9th Cir. 1977); Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1966).
39. The House Report to the 1909 Act suggested an alternative recovery of "one
or the other ... whichever is greater." H.R. RKP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 17
(1909). See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwin Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1940);
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1179 (9th
Cir. 1977); Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d
508 (6th Cir. 1954). See also HOWEUL'S COPYIGHT LAW 169 (rev. ed. A. Latman 1962).

40. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971); Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co.,
1961), af'd, 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963).
132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30, 35 (N.D. Ill.
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more dangerous to innocent infringers than the cumulative recovery of actual damages and profits. If the copyright owner
was provided a sympathetic judge to hear the case, the owner
could obtain an inordinate award of statutory damages merely
by failing to prove actual damages or profits. In its discretion,
the court could manipulate its "best estimate" of the undetermined damages or profits to give the copyright owner a higher
award than he could otherwise obtain. This problem became a
reality in F.W. Woolworth v. Contemporary Arts, Inc."
2.

Douglas as Applied to an Innocently Infringing Vendor: the Copyright Owner's Discretion to Penalize
the Infringer

Innocently infringing vendors as well as publishers suffered under the Douglas Court's analysis of Section 25(b).
The power of the courts to ignore the vendor's innocence is
most apparent in the 1952 Woolworth case. 42 In Woolworth,
the defendant department store chain purchased 127 dog statuettes which were subsequently sold at a retail price of $1.19.
Woolworth did not know that the ceramic models it purchased were inferior infringing copies of a statuette manufactured by the plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation. At trial,
plaintiff "made no effort"'3 to prove its actual damages and
defendant's profits. The defendant did, however, admit gross
profits of $899.16 and tried to limit the plaintiff's recovery to
this amount." The First Circuit affirmed the trial court's
award of the maximum $5,000 allowed by Section 101(b)" and
cited Douglas as the controlling authority. This holding was
not disturbed by the United States Supreme Court on
certiorari.
In a powerful dissent, Justice Black pointed out the grotesque result achieved by reliance on Douglas: "[H]ere the
trial judge gave judgment for statutory damages in an amount
that smacks of punitive qualities. .

.

. [T]his Court has held

that the amount of such damages is committed to the unre41.
42.
43.

344 U.S. 228 (1952).
Id.
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162, 168 (1st Cir.

1951) (emphasis added).
44.

344 U.S. at 235.

45.

17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1947) (the codified successor of § 25(b) of the 1909 Act).
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viewable discretion of a trial judge." 6 Black urged the Court
to "heed the admonition.

. .

that the object of §101(b) is not

to inflict punishment but to award an injured copyright owner
-7
that which in fairness is his 'and nothing beyond this.'
3.

The Congressional Response to Section 25(b)

Congressional advocates of safeguards for innocent indirect infringers reacted bitterly to Section 25(b) from the time
it became law. Between 1924 and 1940, fourteen bills were
submitted to Congress specifically providing that the innocent
infringer should be insulated from all liability or from the imposition of damages.'8
In 1946, Congress finally acknowledged that innocent indirect infringers merited special protection. Such protection,
however, was extended to innocent indirect infringers of
trademarks, but not to infringers of copyrights. Section
1114(2) of the Lanham Act 9 provided that printers and publishers who innocently infringed trademarks would not be liable for damages or profits.50 Innocent indirect infringers of
copyright remained subject to the strictures of Section 25(b)
as it was construed by the Douglas Court.
The lack of safeguards for innocent indirect infringers of
copyright has remained a topic of great concern to commentators. In 1958, Professors Latman and Tager submitted a comprehensive reappraisal of the problem of innocent infringement to the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks,
46. 344 U.S. at 236 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 235 (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwin Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390,
399 (1940)).
48. See Latman & Tager, supra note 1, at 149-52.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (1946).
50.

[W]here an infringer is engaged solely in the business of printing the

mark for others and establishes that he was an innocent infringer, the
owner of the right infringed shall be entitled as against such an infringer
only to an injunction against future printing; where the infringement
complained of is contained in or is part of paid advertising matter in a

newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical the remedies of the
owner of the right infringed as against the publisher or distributor shall

be confined to an injunction against the presentation of such advertising
matter in future issues . . . [p]rovided, [tihat these limitations shall
apply only to innocent infringers . ... "
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(a) (1962) (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1946)

(injunctive relief) and § 1117 (1975) (actual damages and profits).
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and Copyrights.1 They contended that:
The problems common to a particular group, such as ven-

dors, printers [and] periodical publishers, . .. may call

for special treatment ... [but that] the remedial
problems may be more significant than the general question of liability. In other words, state of mind might be
considered irrelevant to the question of infringement but
might be made determinative of the remedies available'
against the infringer.2
The ambiguity of the statutory damages clause of Section
25(b) had resulted in judicial interpretation of its language
against the innocent infringer. If the 1909 Act clearly provided that the infringer's innocence was "determinative" of
the availability of damages against him, as Latman and Tager
suggested it should, the Douglas interpretation would probably not have occurred.
IV. TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INFRINGERS UNDER
THE 1976 ACT
Continuing the trend of the 1909 Act, the United States
Copyright Act of 1976 makes available to copyright owners a
tripartite remedial scheme of injunctive relief,58 actual damages and profits," and statutory damages. 5"
In language similar to the 1909 Act, clause (1) of Section
504(c), the statutory damges provision, states that: "Except as
provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner
may elect at any time before final judgment is rendered, to
recover instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages. . . in a sum of not less than $250 or more
than $10,000 as the court considers just.""
Clause (2) of Section 504(c) was "the subject of extensive
discussion"' in the Congressional hearings because it contains
the "'innocent infringer' provision"' 8 of the Act. The clause
provides:
51. Latman & Tager, supra note 1, at 139, 155-57.
52. Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added).

53. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1976).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. § 504(a)-(b).
Id. § 504(c).
Id. (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2 Sess. 163 (1976).
Id.
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In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of prov-

ing, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court is [sic] its
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to
a sum of not less than $100."
The House Report adds the necessary interpretive gloss to
clause (2) of Section 504(c):
The basic principle underlying this provision is that the
courts should be given discretion to ... lower the mini-

mum [statutory damages] where the infringer is innocent
....

The 'innocent infringer' provision. .. which would

allow reduction of minimum statutory damages to $100
*

.

.is sufficient to protect against unwarrantedliability

in cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringement,
and it offers adequate insulation to users . .. who are

particularly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit.60
Despite Congress's ostensible committment to protect
users such as retailers, printers, and publishers against liability, it seriously undermined the thrust of Section 504(c)(2) in
several ways.
A.

The Copyright Owner May Elect Actual Damages

The question of whether an innocent infringer can merely
incur liability for the statutory amount of $100 is not totally
within the court's discretion. The court may take the infringer's innocence into account only if the copyright owner
elects statutory damages. The House Report plainly states
that "[riecovery of actual damages and profits.

. .

or of statu-

tory damages under section 504(c) is alternative and for the
copyright owner to elect." '
If the copyright owner elects actual damages and profits
rather than statutory damages, he may obtain cumulative relief. Section 504(c)(1) provides that the copyright owner may
obtain his "actual damages and any additional profits of the
infringer .... ""

The House Report states that actual damages and profits

59. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976).
60. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2 Sess. 162 (1976) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 161.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1976).
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each have a remedial function: "Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement,
and profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly
benefiting from a wrongful act."68 It follows that if the copyright owner elects actual damages and profits against an innocent infringer, Section 504, in effect, shifts the owner's risk of
loss to the innocent infringer.
B. The Election of Statutory Damages
1. The Courts Have Broad Discretion to Consider Actual Damages: Douglas is Revived
Congress also weakened the innocent infringer protection
of Section 504(c)(2) when the copyright owner elects statutory
damages. The very language of Section 504(c)(2) states that if
the court finds the infringer innocent, it "may reduce the
award" ' to $100; the court is not compelled by Section
504(c)(2) to reduce the copyright owner's award. If the court
decides not to lower the minimum from $250 to $100, Section
504(c)(1) states that the court may award damages "in a sum
of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just."8 The House Report is silent as to whether Section 504(c)(1) is even applicable in a case of innocent infringement. It was precisely this ambiguous language of judicial
discretion that allowed the Douglas Court to construe the
1909 Act's provisions against the innocent infringer.
To prevent any misconception of the purpose of the judicial discretion provision of Section 504(c)(1), Congress asserts
that the doctrine of Douglas is still in force. The House Report states that "there is nothing in section 504 to prevent a
court from taking account of evidence concerning actual damages and profits in making an award of statutory damages
within the range set out in subsection (c)." This suggests
that if the copyright owner elects statutory damages, the court
would not abuse its discretion in awarding its best estimate of
his actual damages and defendant's profits. Therefore, regardless of whether the copyright owner elects actual damages and
profits or statutory damages, the court may shift the copy63. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2 Sess. 161 (1976).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
65. Id. § 504(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
66. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2 Sess. 161 (1976) (emphasis added).
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right owner's risk of loss to the innocent infringer.
The historical justification for making actual damages
available against the innocent infringer consists of two arguments: (1) that copyright infringement is analogous to the tort
of conversion; and (2) that unlike the copyright owner, the innocent infringer is in a position to guard against the infringement by making diligent inquiry or by obtaining indemnity or
insurance.
C.

The Analogy to Conversion
1. De Acosta v. Brown Ignores the Majority Rule

67
In the classic case of De Acosta v. Brown, Judge Clark,
writing for the majority of the Second Circuit panel, posited
that the view that "damage should be limited to such as can
be foreseen . . . does not apply to conversion. . . . "Is Judge
Clark argued that because copyright infringement is analogous to conversion," a copyright owner should be able to obtain actual damages against an innocent indirect infringer.
The Court of Appeal held that a magazine publisher who indirectly infringed by publishing excerpts from an infringing
book, though the lower court found him innocent, was liable
for actual damages.
In dissent, Judge Learned Hand agreed with Clark's analogy of copyright infringment to conversion, but argued that
the intent required to commit a conversion is absent in the
case of innocent indirect infringement:

[I]t is true that if, for instance, I carry off as mine another's watch in my bag, it is no excuse that I think it
mine. However, I do not convert it, whatever acts of dominion I exercise over my bag, if I do not know, or am
not chargeable with notice, that there is a watch in the
67. 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944).
68. Id. at 412.
69. It has been generally held that copyright infringement is a tort. See, e.g.,
Turton v. United States, 212 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1954); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138
F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943); Vitagraph, Inc. v. Grobaski, 46 F.2d 813 (W.D. Mich. 1931);
Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); H.M. Kolbe Co. v. Shaff, 240 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified
on other grounds, 352 F.2d 285 (1965); Pickford Corp. v. Deluxe Laboratories, Inc.,
169 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. Cal. 1958). Despite this general rule, there are apparently no

reported American cases, other than De Acosta v. Brown, which analogize an indirect
copyright infringement to the tort of conversion.
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bag, though I may have equally denied the owner's
right.70

Judge Hand merely analogized the general common law rule
of the intent necessary to convert to the case of an indirect
infringement. Dean Prosser sums up the rule: "A conversion
can result only from conduct intended to affect the chattel
..

.

. The intent required is not necessarily a matter of con-

scious wrongdoing. It is rather an intent to exercise a dominion or control over the goods .

. . .

,

It was clear to Judge Hand that to complete the analogy
of conversion to the case of an innocent indirect infringement,
the infringing work and the appropriated work must be
viewed as "separate chattels," the infringing work "embodying" the copyrighted work. Applying his analysis to the case
at bar, Judge Hand contended that the defendant publisher
did not intend to affect the plaintiff's copyrighted work embodied within the excerpt published. Nor did the defendant
have reason to suspect that the excerpt contained protected
material. Therefore, the defendant did not "convert" the
copyrighted work and damages should not have been awarded.
Judge Hand's analysis is easily transposable to the case of
the innocently infringing record retailer, who, like the publisher, is also an indirect infringer. When a retailer sells a record without knowledge or reason to suspect that it contains a
pirated recording, the retailer does not have the intent necessary to convert and, therefore, should not be held liable for
actual damages.
The British Copyright Act of 1956 does not actually
adopt Judge Hand's approach, but arrives at the same result.
The 1956 British Act would hold the innocently infringing re70. 146 F.2d at 413 (Hand, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
71. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added). Accord,
Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 117 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), modified
on other grounds, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954)(conversion requires "an intent to assert
a right ... which is, in fact, adverse to that of the owner."); Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29
Cal. 2d 541, 550 (1946) ("[t]o establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership
over them. . . ."); Watkins v. Layton, 182 Kan. 702, 707, 324 P.2d 130, 134 (1958)

("The intention required is simply an intent to use or dispose of the goods..
");
McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 526, 218 A.2d 408 (1966) (quoting 89 C.J.S.
§ 7 (1955)), afl'd, 95 N.J. Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (1967) ("an intent to convert
consummated by some positive act, is necessary to constitute conversion ..
"). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965) ("Conversion is an intentional exercise
of dominion or control over a chattel. .. ").
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cord retailer liable in conversion for the sale of counterfeit
records, but would not allow recovery of damages against him.
D.

The Strict Liability Rationale

In response to the Latman and Tager study, Professor
Nimmer submitted a letter to the Copyright Office outlining
his position on innocent infringement.7 8 His position has since
become known as the "strict liability" approach to innocent
infringement. 4 In his letter, Nimmer offered three arguments
for shifting the copyright owner's risk of loss to the innocent
infringer. 75 He contended that the innocent infringer, unlike
the copyright owner, is (1) able to prevent the infringement
by making diligent inquiry, (2) able to obtain an indemnity
agreement from his supplier, or (3) able to secure insurance.
In his defense of the availability of actual damages
against the innocent infringer, Professor Nimmer fails to take
into account three significant considerations: (1) the individual differences of ability of each indirect infringer to prevent
an infringement by making inquiry or to obtain indemnity or
insurance, (2) the relative abilities of each class of indirect infringer to guard against an infringement by Nimmer's three
suggested means, and (3) social, economic, or technological
developments that may hamper the ability of an indirect infringer to guard against the infringement.
The application of Nimmer's three-fold rationale to record retailers will demonstrate the unfairness of his arbitrary
approach to innocent infringement. Of all indirect infringers,
the record retailer is perhaps least capable of protecting himself by making inquiry or by obtaining self-protection.
72. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
73. Letter from Melville B. Nimmer to Copyright Office (June 16, 1958), reprinted in STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE CoMMirrEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

86th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1960)

[hereinafter cited as Nimmer's Letter].
74. 316 F.2d at 308.
75. The text of Nimmer's Letter is in pertinent part the following:
It is my view that basic to the problem of innocent infringement must
be the underlying premise that as between two innocent parties (i.e., the
copyright owner and the infringer), it is the innocent infringer who must

suffer, since he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an opportunity to
guard against the infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at least the ability to guard against the infringement (by an indemnity agreement from
his supplier and/or by insurance).
Nimmer's Letter, supra note 73.
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1. Diligent Inquiry is no Longer as Effective
Preventing Counterfeit Sales

in

In 1958, the year Professor Nimmer submitted his letter
to the Copyright Office, record piracy was a makeshift enterprise. At that time pirated product was often poorly recorded
and shoddily packaged. The suspicious appearance of such
"bootleg" recordings is illustrated in the 1963 case of Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co. 76 In holding a department
store chain vicariously liable for the sale of bootleg records by
a store concessionaire, the Second Circuit observed that "the
'bootleg' recordings were somewhat suspicious on their face;
they bore no name of any manufacturerupon the labels or on
the record jackets. ...
The alerting cover of a bootleg record prevented its mass
circulation through the legal chain of distribution. The pirate
was usually compelled to sell his crude merchandise to flea
markets or to other vendors outside of the conventional mainstream. If the pirate wished to sell his goods directly to a legitimate retailer, it was incumbent upon the pirate to be sure
that his buyer was a willing accomplice. Sometimes the pirate
would even solicit a business associate. For example, in the
1956 case of Miller v. Goody, the trial court observed that
the defendant record dealers "had been acquainted with Mr.
Krug [a co-defendant] in his capacity as a record salesman for
the Colony Record & Radio Center, but both assert that they
found nothing surprising or suspicious when it appeared that
he was also in the business of manufacturing records under
7' 9
his own label.
During the early "bootleg period," if a record pirate offered a shipment of illegal merchandise to an honest retailer,
the suspicious appearance of the bootleg cover or the solicitous behavior of the pirate usually put the retailer on notice
to make diligent inquiry. An immediate inquiry by the retailer
would probably settle any doubt in his mind that the records
were infringing.
But the entire thrust of record piracy has changed. Piracy
is no longer a sporadic and imprecise endeavor, but instead, is
76.
77.
78.
79.

316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
139 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
Id. at 178.
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a pervasive and exacting practice that has been infiltrated by
organized crime. The modern counterfeiter's precise object is
to saturate the retail market with letter perfect copies of legal
records. The new sophistication of record piracy is reflected in
the deceptive quality of the illegal product. In many cases, the
artwork of a legal record is reproduced photographically. And
nearly perfect sound quality is attainable by acquiring the
"master stamp" used by record companies to manufacture legal product.
Admissions by record company executives indicate that
their investigators frequently find it impossible to detect
counterfeit records. Joseph Smith, chairman of the board of
Elektra/Asylum/Nonesuch Records has allegedly reported
that "[c]ounterfeiting of records and tapes is getting to be big
business. They aren't playing games now. These things are
damn good quality. It's hard to tell the imitations even when
they come back to us as returns."80 Gary Davis, senior vice
president of promotion at Motown Records is even more candid. He is quoted as saying that some counterfeiters
[h]ave facilities and recording studios more sophisticated
than some legitimate firms. They steal the master of a record and press their own version, duplicate the cover from
top to bottom, sell the goods to distributors or to record
stores-and you can't tell the difference from the
authorized release. And we often can't tell the difference, either, when the unsold records are returned to us
As between record companies and record retailers, the record companies are in a superior position to prevent theft of
master records and to determine whether their releases have
been pirated. It follows that if record companies cannot
identify a counterfeit product, retailers would have even
greater difficulty detecting it. Therefore, unlike the conditions
that existed in 1958, the physical appearance of a modern
counterfeit record usually will not trigger the retailer's inquiry
of the supplier.
Moreover, the deceptive quality of the new generation of
counterfeit records allows the pirate to penetrate the retail
market without selling directly to retailers. Modern counter80.
81.

TIME,
DAILY

Mar. 10, 1980, at 70 (emphasis added).
BREEZE, May 8, 1980, at 8 (emphasis added).
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feiting is most profitable if the pirate sells to willing wholesalers and other independent distributors who in turn resell the
pirated product to the many retailers who purchase from independent suppliers.8 2 The counterfeit records could be transferred two or three times before they are ultimately purchased
by the retailer. One commentator describes the intermediate
sources available to the retailer: "The rack jobber, as commonly understood, services supermarkets, variety stores, drug
stores, and other busy retail outlets, whereas the one-stop
stocks the records of many manufacturers so that jukebox operators and small dealers can purchase their requirements at
one location ....."8 Thus, the retailer may never deal directly with a solicitous pirate or with any suspicious individual. It is more likely that the retailer would be approached
with counterfeit product by his regular supplier, who has himself innocently purchased the records. If the album covers appear authentic and the supplier's suspicion is not aroused, the
retailer will have little reason to make inquiry of his supplier.
The inability of a retailer to make effective inquiry is
highlighted by the record company admissions noted earlier,84
which indicate that record companies are frequently unable to
distinguish between counterfeit and legal returns. "Returns,"
in record industry practice, consist of all unsold merchandise,
defective or otherwise, that is returned to the manufacturer
by distributors and retailers for credit. The policy of the record companies is to redistribute non-defective returns, rather
than to destroy them. 85 It follows that if counterfeit returns
are not detected by the record companies, they may be recycled to distributors and retailers. Under these conditions,
no amount of supplier screening or inquiry could prevent
most infringements.
Diligent inquiry is no longer the potent deterrent that it
was in 1958. In light of the current sophistication of record
piracy the relevant policy question is no longer who is in a
better position to make diligent inquiry, but rather, who is in
a better position to make counterfeit records detectable?
82. See distribution charts reproduced in S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra
note 22, at xxiii-xxvii.
83. Id. at 104.
84. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra.
85. Interview with Shirish Contractor, Director of Royalties of Capitol Records,
Inc., in Los Angeles (April 9, 1980).
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There is no doubt that the immediate step to be taken in
preventing indirect infringements is largely a matter of technology. If record companies can invent a counterfeit detection
device and make it available to retailers, many infringing sales
could be prevented. But is not such a new policy based on
comparative abilities to invent a detection device equally as
perilous as Nimmer's 1958 "diligent inquiry" argument? The
practical reality which supports a new policy can change as
the practice of record piracy continues to evolve. In 1985, record companies could claim that counterfeiters have emasculated the new policy by duplicating the detection devices that
had been successfully employed.
The British Copyright Act of 1956 offers an innovative
case-by-case approach to indirect infringement that is not dependent on, but instead incorporates, the state of the record
piracy art. Under the 1956 British Act, a seller of infringing
records is not liable for damages unless he has reason to suspect that the records infringe. In determining whether the
seller has reason to suspect, the 1956 British Act would permit consideration of factors such as whether the retailer was
compelled as a practical matter to deal directly with an independent supplier rather than with the manufacturer, whether
the retailer did in fact make diligent inquiry, whether the
counterfeit records were undetectable upon sensory
inspection, and whether the retailer had access to a detection
device. Under the 1956 British Act, the state of the record
piracy art is not the final arbiter as to who shall bear the
copyright owner's loss resulting from counterfeit sales.
2. Indemnity Agreements are Not a Trade Custom
Among Record Retailers
Professor Nimmer's second policy argument for making
actual damages available against the innocent infringer is that
the infringer, unlike the copyright owner, is able to obtain indemnity from his supplier. This argument may be valid theoretically, but in practice it results in arbitrariness and discrimination. The argument disregards the fact that the
availability of indemnity agreements to any class of indirect
infringer is influenced by existing trade customs of the class.
The policy also fails to consider individual differences of ability to obtain indemnity, due to varying types of distributors
that serve a given community. The "indemnity" argument is
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especially arbitrary when applied to record retailers, for whom
indemnity is not a custom of the trade.
In 1958, Professor Brown pointed out, in what is apparently the only contemporary survey on the availability of indemnity and insurance to infringers,8 6 that the practical ability of any infringer to obtain indemnity is largely dependent
on the custom of his trade. Brown identifies the classes of infringer that make use of indemnity agreements:
[I]ndemnities are elaborately developed in the complex of
relationships among advertising agencies, producers of
programs, licensors of musical performing rights, and
broadcasters ....
Magazine publishers, it appears, routinely require indemnity from agencies and advertisers
with respect to material supplied by them. . . . In the
book-publishing world, . . . resort to the author depends
on the relationship between him and the publisher ....
Sometimes authors are expected to pay; sometimes they
67
are not.
In 1958, it was not customary for record retailers to obtain
indemnification from their distributors. In contrast to those
professions in which indemnity agreements were "elaborately
developed," indemnity in a standardized form was simply not
available to record retailers. This condition has persisted to
this day. s8
3.

Insurance Against Infringement is Not Available to
Record Retailers

In his third argument, Professor Nimmer claims that the
innocent infringer, unlike the copyright owner, is in a position
to obtain insurance. This rationale for making actual damages
available against innocent infringers is also arbitrary and discriminatory in its application. Theoretically, copyright owners
as well as innocent infringers may obtain insurance if they are
86. R.S. Brown, The Operation of the Damages Provisions of the Copyright
Law: An Exploratory Study, Study No. 23, in STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDI-

cARY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1960).

87. Id. at 86-88.
88. NARM Counsel, Charles B. Ruttenberg, claims that record retailers "may
wish to seek" indemnity. He recently mailed a simple one page indemnity agreement
to NARM members as a sample. Letter from Charles B. Ruttenberg to NARM members (May 14, 1980).
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willing to pay a high enough premium. Second, the argument
discriminates against those infringers who cannot afford an
exorbitant premium. And finally, the practical availability of
insurance is largely dependent on business trends in the insurance field. Some classes of infringer are more insurable
than others. When the "insurance" rationale is applied to record retailers, particular hardship results. The present trend
of the insurance business is not to insure record retailers
against innocent infringements.
Insurers have been traditionally reluctant to protect record companies or retailers against the risk of counterfeit
sales. The reason for this negative trend is that carriers would
not be insuring against a less than probable risk, but against
an almost calculable business loss.89 For such insurance to be
profitable for the carrier, the policy would have to contain a
number of intricate exceptions, and the cost of the policy
would be prohibitive. To this day, carriers have not seriously
90
entertained the notion of insuring against counterfeit sales.
Professor Brown provides us with an overview of the contemporary trend of the insurance field in protecting various
classes of infringer. He indicates that carriers do not insure
record retailers against counterfeit sales: "The industries
which make extensive use of . . . insurance protection are
about the same as those which have thoroughly systematized
the use of indemnity agreements: broadcasters, producers for
broadcasting, advertising agencies, advertisers. However, in91
surance seems to be little used in the music field."
4. Reappraisal of the Strict Liability Approach: A Defense of Innocence Should be Available to all Indirect Infringers
At present, the strict liability rationale-and the actual
damages it imposes-is arbitrary and unfair to record retailers. Under modern record piracy conditions the record retailer
89. Interview with Donna Carson, Account Executive of Marsh & McLennan, in
Los Angeles (August 12, 1980).
90. Executives of the two insurance carriers that write most of the entertainment policies in the western United States, American National General Agencies and
Albert G. Ruben & Company, have never written a counterfeit insurance policy and
deny that such a policy exists. Interview with Roberta Davis, Account Executive of
Johnson & Higgins of California, in Los Angeles (August 11, 1980).
91. Brown, supra note 86, at 88.
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is unable to guard against infringement by using the three
means suggested by Professor Nimmer. The inability of record retailers to make an effective inquiry or to obtain selfprotection is, however, a temporal condition. Ten years from
now the record retailer may be in a better position to guard
against an infringement than other classes of infringer. Ultimately, the strict liability approach operates arbitrarily and
harshly against all indirect infringers.
On what ground may the unfair impact of the strict liability approach be justified? Professor Nimmer suggests that "to
render a complete or partial exemption for the innocent infringer would seriously impair the protection afforded to a
copyright owner. ' Yet, he fails to explain how a remedial defense in which the infringer would bear the burden of proving
his innocence would seriously impair the copyright owner's
monopoly. Indeed, the strict liability approach may unnecessarily burden the indirect infringer's first amendment right to
disseminate knowledge.
E.

The First Amendment Problem

The first stirrings of a conflict between the copyright
clause and the first amendment appeared to emerge during
the Congressional hearings on the passage of the 1909 Act.
During the debate on whether actual damages should be available against the innocently infringing printer, George W. Ogilvie, a Chicago publisher, offered testimony which suggests
that the availability of damages against an innocently infringing printer contravenes the first amendment freedom of the
press:
There is no printer in the United States whom I cannot
get in trouble-serious trouble-so serious that it might
put him out of business. I take to him a set of plates
about which he knows nothing as to the existence of copyright on them. He prints them for me ... and then the
owners of the copyright can get after him and collect
damages.. ..98
Mr. Ogilvie's admonition was unheeded. With the passage of
the 1909 Act, not only was the printer denied the protection
92.
93.

Nimmer's Letter, supra note 73 (emphasis added).
Latman & Tager, supra note 1, at 145 (emphasis added).
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available to the seller under the 1870 Act, but the seller's protection disappeared as well. At the time the first amendment
was seriously viewed as limiting the scope of the copyright
clause.
Proponents of special treatment for innocent infringers
appeared to base their position on the language of the copyright clause itself, rather than on the first amendment. The
House Report on the 1909 Act states that "[iln enacting a
copyright law, Congress must consider . . . two questions:
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer
and so benefit the public; and [s]econd, how much will the
monopoly granted be detrimental to the public."" The copyright clause provides that the purpose of securing exclusive
rights for authors and inventors is to promote science and the
usable arts. And the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the primary object of conferring a monopoly on authors and inventors is to benefit the public."5 However, the
apparent words of limitation within the copyright clause have
never been viewed by the Court as providing protection for
innocent infringers.
It was not until the De Acosta decision in 1944 that a
federal court discussed the first amendment problem inherent
in making actual damages available against the innocent indirect infringer. In holding an innocently infringing publisher liable for actual damages, the Second Circuit majority claimed
that such an award "would hardly make an appreciable difference to publishers in the conduct of their business . . .
In dissent, Judge Hand vigorously argued that the liability of the defendant publisher for actual damages, even
though unsubstantial, amounted to an unjustifiable burden on
first amendment freedoms.9 7 More recently, Professor Nim94.

H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), reprinted in 6

TIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT

95.

LEGISLA-

AcT (E.F. Brylawski & A. Goldman ed. 1976).

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("[t]he

sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.") (quoting
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). Accord, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954) ("(tlhe economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
efforts by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts' ").

96. 146 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 1944).
97.

[W]e are, in my opinion, committing ourselves to a doctrine which is

wrong in theory, which the cases do not require us to adopt, and which
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mer has supported Judge Hand's view, though not necessarily
in contradiction with his strict liability approach to innocent
infringement. According to Nimmer:
It might be contended that copyright law falls within a
built-in exception to First Amendment protection ...
[I]f a completely liberal reading of the First Amendment
is to be made, then we must ... recognize that the First
Amendment is an amendment, hence superceding anything inconsistent with it which may be found in the main
body of the Constitution. This, of course, includes the
Copyright Clause."8
The increasing body of literature" and case law'0 0 recognizing a tension between the copyright clause and the first
amendment suggests that Judge Hand may have correctly
identified the conflicting interests in De Acosta. Although he
did not broaden the scope of his opinion to include first
amendment protection for other indirect infringers, it appears
logical that Judge Hand's analysis would extend to printers,
vendors and others who are closely involved in the "dissemination of knowledge."
imposes a risk upon publishers that is likely to prove an appreciable and
very undesirable burden upon the freedom of the press ....

If my

brothers are right, a publisher must be prepared to respond in damages
to any author who can prove that the publisher has incorporated, however innocently, and at whatever remove, any parts of the author's work.
If that possibility is to hover over all publications, it would, I believe, be
not a negligible depressant upon the dissemination of knowledge.
Id. at 412-13 (Hand, J., dissenting).
98. NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 1.10[A]. The type of judicial review that is applicable to conflicts between the copyright clause and the first amendment has not as
yet been determined. Id. In testing first amendment constraints on federal legislation,
the United States Supreme Court has employed a balancing test. See Am. Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950) ("When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of
these two conflicting interests demands the greatest protection under the particular
circumstances presented.").
99. See, e.g., Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970); Nimmer, Copyright and
the First Amendment, 17 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 255 (1970).
100. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 116 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), modified on other grounds, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979) ("[t]he First Amendment does mark out some boundary for the protection that may be afforded a creator under the copyright laws ....

1).
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V. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INDIRECT INFRINGERS
UNDER BRITISH LAW

In sixteenth century England, copyright was an instru-

ment of the Crown employed to rigorously censor all printed
matter that offended the Church. Under Henry VIII's Stationers' Company, which was formed in 1556, and the subsequent
licensing acts, an author could not publish a book without
obtaining a government license. 0 1 But as the eighteenth century began, the licensing acts "lapsed because of the indignation of the Commons against the arbitrary power of the license ... "101 The Statute of Anne,103 enacted by Parliament
in 1710, was a direct response to government suppression of
heretical books and pamphlets. The celebrated statute not
only rewarded authors for their creative labor, but also protected innocent indirect infringers. 10 4 The wording and substance of the innocent infringer provision was almost identical
to that of the 1790 Act adopted by the United States
Congress.105

The innocent infringer provision of the Statute of Anne
101. See R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 21 (1912); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 29 (1968). Failure to comply with the
strict regulations of the Stationers' Company could result in harsh punishment. As
one legal historian reports:
The author under such conditions was a very different creature from his
modern successor. As has been wittily said in early days an author usually disappeared immediately after the publication of his work and if he
reappeared at all, did so in the stocks or pillory. To talk about the rights
of authors in Tudor or Stuart England, would have been farcical. The
early history of copyright had nothing to do with the rights of the
author.
A. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-7 (1917).
102. R. BOWKER, supra note 101, at 21-22.
103. Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, c.19, (1709), reprinted in R.S. BROWN JR.,
KAPLAN & BROWN's CASES ON COPYRIGHT 851 app. (1978) [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN
& BROWN]. For an excellent overview of the Statute, see generally H. RANSOM, THE
FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956).
104. The Statute of Anne made available to copyright owners forfeiture and
damages
if any . . . bookseller, printer, or other person . . .shall print, reprint,
or import, or cause to be printed, reprinted, or imported, any [copyrighted] book or books, without the consent of the proprietor . . . or
knowing the same to be so printed or reprinted, without the consent of
the proprietors, shall sell, publish, or expose for sale . . . any such book
or books . ...
KAPLAN & BROWN, supra note 103, at 851.
105. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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also contained the deficiencies that later emerged in the 1790
Act. Like the 1790 Act, the Statute of Anne's implementation
of safeguards for innocent indirect infringers was inconsistent.
Publishers and vendors were protected, but printers and importers were not. Furthermore, Parliament offered absolute
immunity to those innocent infringers who were protected,
thus making it impossible for copyright owners to obtain forfeiture or injunctive relief against them. The British Copyright Act of 1842106 (1842 British Act) continued the inconsistent application of safeguards to innocent indirect infringers,
as well as the policy of absolute immunity for those protected.
The British Copyright Act of 1911107 (1911 British Act)

remedied the problems of absolute immunity and inconsistent
treatment of innocent indirect infringers. The 1911 British
Act insulated such infringers from infringement liability, but
held them liable for a conversion. The broad wording of section 2(2) appeared to protect vendors, printers, publishers,
and importers from infringement liability if they were
innocent:
Copyright in a work shall ...

be deemed to be infringed

by any person who-(a) sells or lets for hire, or by way of
trade exposes or offers for sale or hire; or (b) distributes
either for the purposes of trade or to such an extent as to
affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright; or (c) by
way of trade exhibits in public; or (d) imports for sale or
hire ... any work which to his knowledge infringes copy108
right ....
However, under section 7,109 which provided the copyright
106. Copyright Act, 1842, 4 & 5 Vict., c. 45 (1842). The British Copyright Act of
1842 provided that
[i]f any person shall ... print or cause to be printed, either for sale or
exportation, any book in which there shall be subsisting copyright, without the consent of the proprietor thereof, or shall import for sale or hire
any such book so having been unlawfully printed ... or, knowing such
book to have been so unlawfully printed or imported, shall sell, publish,
or expose for sale or hire . .. any such book so unlawfully printed or
imported . .. such offender shall be liable ....
Copyright Act, 1842, 4 & 5 Vict., c. 45, § 15 (1842).
107. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (1911).
108. Id. § 2(2) (emphasis added).
109. Section 7 of the 1911 British Act provided that:
[a]ll infringing copies of any work in which copyright subsists, or of any
substantial part thereof, and all plates used or intended to be used for
the production of such infringing copies, shall be deemed to be the prop-
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owner with a cause of action in conversion, the indirect infringer's intent was irrelevant in establishing the conversion.
As Lord Justice Romer stated in Sutherland PublishingCo. v.
Caxton PublishingCo., 110 (SutherlandI/): "[I]f a person who
has not himself infringed the copyright ... innocently sell, or

exposes, or offers for sale, an infringing work, he does not
thereby commit an infringement of copyright ....
[H]owever, by virtue of section 7 . . .the owner of the copyright . . . could take proceedings . . .in respect of any con-

version thereof." '
The above excerpt from Sutherland If illustrates an important difference between the American and British law of
conversion. Although the British law is in general agreement
with the American view of conversion, 11 2 there is a general exception under British law that "intention is immaterial in
cases where a man deals with goods as his own." '

s

In a typi-

cal British case of innocent indirect infringement, the common law exception dispensing with an intent to convert would
be controlling. In Sutherland Publishing Co. v. Caxton Publishing Co.,11 4 (SutherlandI), book publishers who innocently
infringed by binding together portions of a copyrighted work
into their book were held liable for a conversion, although
their act "was in fact an unconscious conversion.'"115

The establishment of a conversion under section 7 of the
1911 British Act could not result in a cumulative award of actual damages and profits. The traditional British view is that
an account of profits is alternative to an award of damages.116
Nonetheless, the copyright owner could elect to obtain actual
damages after he had exhausted the possibility of obtaining
damages and profits for the infringement.
The irreconcilability of sections 2(2) and 7 was higherty of the owner of the copyright, who accordingly may take proceedings for the recovery of the possession thereof or in respect of the conversion thereof.
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 7 (1911).
110. [1937] 4 All E.R. 405 (C.A.).
111. Id. at 414.
112. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. v. Mac Nicoll [1918] 88 L.J.K.B. 601, 605
(conversion requires "an intention on the part of the defendant. . . to deny the owner's right or to assert a right which is inconsistent with the owner's right .... ).
113. Caxton Pub'l Co. v. Sutherland Pub'l Co. [1938] 4 All E.R. 389, 395 (H.L.).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 395.
116. Id. at 401.
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lighted by the fact that, under certain circumstances, damages
flowing from a conversion could be greater than those resulting from the infringement. If the infringer was innocent, section 2(2) in such an instance would be emasculated. The
Court of Appeal, in Sutherland II, illustrated that the publishers "may have reproduced a very few copies of high intrinsic value, which amounts to much more than the damage done
to the copyright, which may be almost negligible. ' ' 117 Because
the measure of damages for the conversion under British law
is the value of the copies, rather than the depreciation of the
value of the copyright,118 the copyright owner could conceivably recover more for the conversion than for the infringement.
The British Copyright Act of 1956 remedied the inconsistent treatment accorded to innocent indirect infringers under
the 1911 British Act.
VI.

TREATMENT OF INNOCENT INDIRECT INFRINGERS UNDER
THE 1956 BRITISH ACT

The British Copyright Act of 1956 (1956 British Act) ' is
the first British copyright statute to altogether eliminate the
availability of damages against the innocent indirect infringer.
In effect, the Act adopts the approach that the copyright owner can only obtain injunctive relief and profits against the innocent indirect infringer. Parliament accomplished this result
by reworking the bifurcated infringement and conversion
scheme of the 1911 British Act.
The 1956 British Act continues the approach of section
2(2) of the 1911 British Act by insulating innocent indirect
infringers of copyrighted works from all infringement liability,
innocent indirect
and by providing infringement immunity12 to
0
infringers of protected sound recordings.
117.
118.

[19361 1 All E.R. 177, 181 (C.A.).
Id. at 180.

119. Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74 (1956). The 1956 British Act is
reprinted with annotations in J. EDDY, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1957). The 1956 British Act and its predecessor are reprinted without annotations in COPINGER, supra
note 4, at 509, app. A. Other secondary sources on the 1956 British Act include: T.
BLANCO WHITE, R. JACOB & J. DAVIES, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT, AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS (1978); W. LEAPER, COPYRIGHT AND PERFORMING ARTS (1957); P.
CARTERRUCK & E. SKONE JAMES, COPYRIGHT: MODERN LAW AND PRACTICE (1965).
120. Section 5(2) of the 1956 British Act provides that a copyright in a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by any person
who, without the license of the owner of the copyright, imports an arti-
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Parliament remedied the inconsistency between sections
2(2) and 7 of the 1911 Act by removing the availability of conversion damages against the innocent indirect infringer. This
modification of former section 7 amounts to a legislative redefining of conversion as applied to the copyright field. The
1911 Act had permitted the copyright owner to obtain damages in conversion against the innocent indirect infringer due
to an exception at common law which dispensed with the requirement of intent to covert. Under section 18(2) of the 1956
Act, the innocent indirect infringer may still be liable for a
conversion, but damages cannot be imposed.121 The net effect
of section 18(2) is that a copyright owner can obtain an injunction and an account of profits against an innocent indirect
infringer, but cannot obtain damages. The traditional British
view is that an account of profits is not a "pecuniary remedy,"
but instead, is an equitable remedy ancillary to an
cle (otherwise than for his private and domestic use) into the United
Kingdom . . . if to his knowledge the making of that article constituted
an infringement of the copyright, or would have constitued such an infringement if the article had been made in the place into which it is so
imported.
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 5(2) (1956). Section 5(3) of the 1956 British
Act provides that a
copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by
any person who, in the United Kingdom. .. and without the license of
the owner of the copyright,-(a) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade
offers or exposes for sale or hire any article, or (b) by way of trade exhibits any article in public, if to his knowledge the making of the article
constituted an infringement of that copyright, or (in the case of an imported article) would have constituted an infringement of that copyright
if the article had been made in the place into which it was imported.
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 5(3) (1956). Section 5(4) of the 1956 British
Act provides that
[t]he last preceding subsection shall apply in relation to the distribution
of any articles either-(a) for purposes of trade, or (b) for other purposes, but to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the
copyright in question, as it applies in relation to the sale of an article.
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 5(4) (1956). The provisions of § 5(2)-(4) are
restated in § 16(2)-(4) of the 1956 British Act, but with respect to sound recordings,
121. Section 18(2) of the 1956 British Act provides as follows:
A plaintiff shall not be entitled . . . to any damages or to any other
pecuniary remedy (except costs) if it is proved or admitted that, at the
time of the conversion or detention in question . . . where the articles
converted or detained were infringing copies, the defendant believed,
and had reasonable grounds for believing, that they were not infringing
copies ....
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 18(2)(b) (1956).
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A.

Liability of Innocently Infringing Record Retailers

Under Section 504 of the United States Copyright Act of
1976, a copyright owner may recover actual damages against
the innocently infringing record retailer in one of two ways: by
election of actual damages and profits, or by submitting the
determination of statutory damages to the court's broad discretion. The infringer's innocence may be a factor in the
court's assessment of statutory damages or it may be ignored.
In any event, the infringer's innocence does not necessarily result in any special treatment.
Unlike the approach of the 1976 Act, section 18(2) of the
1956 British Act offers infringing retailers an unequivocal opportunity to avoid payment of actual damages. Section 18(2)
clearly instructs the British courts that damages are not available against an infringing retailer if he can establish his innocence. 12 8 In arriving at a finding of innocence, the British
courts could consider such factors as whether the counterfeit
records were highly deceptive, whether the retailer had reason
to suspect his supplier of illegal activity, and whether the legal
manufacturer had made available to the retailer a counterfeit
detection device.
The current wave of record piracy in Great Britain has
sparked a controversy as to whether the bar against allowing
recovery of damages against the innocently infringing record
retailer should be eliminated. The British recording industry,
like its American counterpart, is angered by the infiltration of
pirated records into the retail market. It is estimated that
counterfeiting operations are largely responsible for a "drop in
album sales of over 25%.
122. See, e.g., WEA Records Ltd. v. Benson King [1974] 3 All E.R. 81 (Ch.);
Price's Patent Candle Co. v. Bauven's Patent Candle Co. [1858 70 E.R. 302; Smith v.
London & South W. Ry. Co. [18541 69 E.R. 173; Bally v. Taylor [1829] 39 E.R. 28.
However, injunctive relief and damages may be cumulatively granted. See, e.g., Leeds

Indus. Coop. Soc'y Ltd. v. Slack [19241 A.C. 851 (H.L.); Serrao v. Noel [1885] 15 Q.B.
549 (C.A.); Elmore v. Pirrie [1887] L.T. 333.
123. See Young v. Odeon Music House Pty. Ltd. [1978] R.P.C. 621 (Supr. Ct.
N.S.W.) (held, per Australian copyright statute, that innocently infringing record retailer was not liable for actual damages).

124.

HOLLYWOOD

REPORTER, October 16, 1979, at 11. This trade publication sug-

gests that the fiscal problems of the British recording industry are highlighted by the
financial results of Electric & Musical Industries Limited for the 1978-79 year: "The

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

It appears, however, that the containment of record
piracy will not require the excision of the remedial defense of
innocence that is presently available to record retailers. In
1977, the British Copyright Council and the British Phonographic Industry Copyright Association urged the Whitford
Committee, 25 which had convened to consider a revision of
the 1956 British Act, to recommend to Parliament that safeguards for innocently infringing record vendors be abolished
in order to stop the "growing practice of illicit importation
into and distribution"" of counterfeit records in Great Britain. The Whitford Committee, however, arrived at a different
conclusion: "[C]are must be taken to ensure that the interests
of defendants who are wholly innocent are adequately protected ....
[W]e are of the opinion that there should continue to be some provision in the Act for a defense based on
"1127
innocence ....
VII.

CONCLUSION

By comparing the historical problem of innocent infringement with the circumstances of the modern record piracy crisis, this article suggests that a Congressional reevaluation of
the treatment accorded to all innocent indirect infringers
under the 1976 Act is necessary. Professor Ball once wrote
that the United States copyright law contemplates "the extension and increasing adaptation of the copyright laws to the
uses of society in accordance with changing conditions."' 8
The rigid strict liability approach of the 1976 British Act toward innocent infringers is out of step with this mandate. The
1976 Act fails to give sufficient weight to technological advances that may hinder the infringer's ability to make an effective inquiry, to trade customs that may affect his ability to
obtain indemnity, and to business trends that may make insurance unavailable.
group's record division suffered a sharp decline, moving from a $34 million loss in the

second half, leaving a profit of just $4 million for the full year on sales of $900 million." Id.
125. Report of the Committee to Consider the Law on Copyrights and Designs,
CMND. No. 6732 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Whitford Committee]. For an overview

of the Whitford Committee's findings, see Toward a New British Copyright Law, 121
SOLICITORS' J. 584 (1977).
126.
127.
128.

Whitford Committee, supra note 125, § 735.
Id. § 737.
H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 7 (1944).
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In contrast, the 1956 British Act permits a case-by-case
adjudication of each indirect infringer's innocence. The individualized approach of the 1956 Act gives the British courts
power to create a body of common law defining what constitutes "innocence" of an indirect infringer, which could then
be applied in particular cases. The standard of innocence for
each class of infringer would fluctuate in accordance with
changing social, economic, and technological circumstances.
A Congressional realignment of protections afforded
copyright owners and innocent infringers would not necessarily require an adoption of the British bifurcated scheme of
infringement and conversion, together with its remedial
ramifications. Congress could provide adequate protection for
innocent infringers by making available a remedial defense to
infringement based on innocence. A remedial defense that
would be determinative of the availability of actual damages
against all innocent indirect infringers, whether the copyright
owner elects actual damages and profits or statutory damages,
would be less ambiguous and less subject to discriminatory
application than the present law. Moreover, the remedial defense would not require a set of arbitrary public policy arguments to justify it. Nor would such a remedial approach result
in first amendment problems.

